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Lionel, Sawyer & Collins 
Atlantic City's saga, we are told, is of regulation that smothered the golden goose. Reports 
on Colorado say excessive taxation makes doing business impossible. While states regulate 
gaming for social reasons, these situations show the impact regulation can have on profitability. 
Nevada and the other casino states face a major challenge. Twenty years ago, Nevada 
was the only state with legal casinos. Having a geographic monopoly accelerated Nevada's 
growth. In the late 1970s, the monopoly eroded with the legalization of casino gaming in 
Atlantic City. The flood came when the United States Congress decided to legalize casino 
gaming in many states that have Native American tribal lands. Tribes in Minnesota, Connecti-
cut, and Wisconsin opened full casinos on Indian reservations although non-Indians in the 
same states could not open casinos off the reservation. Congressional action caused many 
states to legalize gaming to realize revenues from the gaming activities of their citizens. Nine 
states now have legal non-Indian casinos. The prospect exists for a dozen other states legaliz-
ing casino gaming in the next few years. Both Indian and state-sanctioned casinos throughout 
the United States compete for the same consumer dollar. 
Unlike other industries in the United States that are highly regulated, gaming is either 
virtually unregulated, as are many Indian casinos, or regulated by the state government. The 
federal government has almost no involvement. Every state either has different rules or applies 
its rules differently. 
This article discusses how the differences in regulatory policy between states can affect 
the economics of a state's gaming industry. These differences can make one state's gaming 
industry more competitive than another. Seven major areas of casino regulation can have the 
greatest impact. These are: ( 1) cost of regulatory compliance, including fines and assessments; 
(2) regulatory price controls; (3) ease of entry; (4) taxation; (5) advertising; (6) credit policy; 
and (7) economic controls. 
Cost of Regulatory Compliance 
Each state that allows gaming has some regulation. The two basic types of regulation are 
economic and social. Economic regulation attempts to rectify imperfections in a free market 
for the public benefit to ensure that consumers receive quality service at competitive prices. 
Industries typically perceived to have market imperfections are those with relatively large 
fixed costs (e.g., shipping), where the existence of several large firms serving a community 
would entail the wasteful duplication of costly capital facilities (electricity or gas) or where 
there is a finite supply to be distributed (radio or television airwaves.) Examples of agencies 
regulating such industries include the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Communica-
tions Commission, and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
Absent government interference, the gambling industry in America is not subject to natural 
market imperfections. With relatively little cash outlay, a person can operate a gambling game. 
A table and three cards are enough to play three card monte, and a pair of dice and an alley are 
sufficient to play craps. 
Government involvement in gaming is based on the concept of social regulation, i.e., the 
impact of the industry's product on society. Social regulation usually concerns the public health 
or safety. Examples include the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer 
Products Safety Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Gaming control, how-
ever, is a unique subset of social regulation that involves protecting the public from the non-
health-related detriments of a vice. 
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Nevada was the only state with legal casino gaming between 1931 and 1978. Nevada 
began regulating gaming in the late 1950s primarily to keep criminals out of the gaming 
industry. The initial reason for regulation was fear that the federal government would outlaw 
casino gaming if organized crime could use Nevada-based operations to finance, or conceal 
profits from, other illegal activities. 1 Subsequently, other rationales for keeping the criminal 
element out of the gaming industry were proffered, including beliefs that the perception that 
the casino industry is dishonest would impair the development of the industry;2 that prevent-
ing criminal influence would assure honesty of the games;3 and that keeping the criminal 
element out would assure proper accounting for tax revenues.4 From the premise that the State 
should keep criminals out of the gaming industry, an entire system of regulatory control over 
the gaming industry evolved. Other states that subsequently legalized gaming adopted many 
components of the Nevada system, but all parrot the same basic goals. 
Because every state has a different regulatory system, casinos' cost of complying varies 
between states. Regulatory costs are a mixture of fixed and variable costs that the casinos 
attempt to pass on to patrons through higher costs. In the gaming business, the pricing of the 
gaming experience is not as simple as other businesses where the price of the product goes up 
if the cost of producing the product increases. Casinos provide games for patrons to play. 
Casinos make money by winning it from patrons. The amount won results from the slight 
advantage the casino has in the odds of the game, as little as about 1 percent in craps and 
blackjack. To make more money in a given transaction, the casino must raise its "prices," 
usually by increasing its odds at the 
gaming tables and slots. As the costs 
rise, however, demand for the prod-
uct decreases. If every competitor 
has the same fixed regulatory costs, 
they must compete on another ba-
sis. Now, however, the cost of do-
ing business in New Jersey is higher 
A challenge facing all casino jurisdictions 
is to maintain a high standard of 
regulatory control at the lowest cost. 
than Nevada, and Nevada is higher than other places. Thus, all other things being equal, 
Nevada casinos can offer better odds to patrons than New Jersey casinos can and still make 
the same income from a given game. Better odds will influence price-sensitive players to 
choose Nevada over Atlantic City. The higher the regulatory costs, the smaller the market for 
the casino product will become. 
For many of the reasons stated above, regulation is needed to maintain the integrity of 
the industry. On the other hand, high regulatory costs could burden or destroy the competi-
tiveness of the state's industry. A challenge facing all casino jurisdictions is to maintain a 
high standard of regulatory control at the lowest cost. This may place some states at a com-
petitive disadvantage with other states having little or no regulatory control, but those states 
face a greater downside if their lack of controls causes scandal, disenchantment with gaming, 
and the demise of the industry. 
Economic Controls 
Market forces are powerful. Consumers respond to new products that provide value for 
their money. On the other hand, they resist poor quality and overpriced items. The consumers 
force producers to make better products to stay competitive. These forces continue to im-
prove the general quality of the market, often dramatically. 
The same principles apply to a competitive casino industry. The product is the casino 
experience. Successful casinos find a market among potential patrons, and serve that market 
by providing good value. Not all casinos need to be Caesars Palace or The Mirage. Just as all 
people are not attracted to the same automobile, they are not attracted to the same casino. 
Some people like the luxury of Caesars Palace and are willing to pay for it. Others want a 
bargain and may choose the Lady Luck. What do Caesars and Lady Luck have in common? 
Both know their patrons' desires, cater to those desires and offer exceptional value for the 
money. They are also successful. 
Unsuccessful casinos share common traits. They either do not find a market niche or 
cannot compete against other casinos for the same market segment because they offer an 
inferior product or a similar product at higher costs. It is also why Nevada is likely to see some 
major casino-resorts fail in the next five years. New products, such as MGM Grand and Trea-
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sure Island, will grab significant market share. Casinos serving the same market segments but 
offering inferior products will fail. 
A misconception is that all casino closures hurt the local economy. The opposite is often 
true. Suppose a market can only support five resorts when there are six. This results in an 
excess supply of games and devices. The least profitable hotel has some market share. With 
the sixth and least profitable hotel open, the other five resorts are less healthy because they 
earn less. They are also less attractive to lenders and investors. When the sixth resort closes, 
the other resorts quickly absorb its customers and become healthier. The resort that fails often 
is the least competitive because it has an inferior product or is overpriced. 
Another misconception is that a casino opening may hurt the local economy. Suppose a 
new mega-resort opens in a casino market. This new resort will create greater competition for 
patrons. Initially, this may lower the profits of existing casinos that lose patrons to the new 
resort. Two alternative conclusions may result. The first is that the market will be strong enough 
or will grow to accommodate the expansion. The second is that the weakest casino will fail. In 
either case, the market is better off. The first case is obviously good for the local economy 
because it is in an expansion mode. In the latter case, the quality of the remaining properties is 
better than before the expansion. With this better stock, the community maintains an edge in 
competition with casinos and other recreational products in other areas. 
Regulatory agencies charged with maintaining the integrity of a gaming industry may 
confuse their role with that of agencies designed to regulate imperfect markets. The gaming 
regulators may see many casino closures and feel compelled to intervene to protect creditors 
and employees. They also may feel they can predict which projects will succeed and which 
will fail and make licensing decisions on that basis. 
Government should not to attempt to alter market forces. It should not help a struggling 
casino remain open nor sentence it to a premature death. Keeping an ailing casino open pro-
motes oversupply and hurts the entire market. Government's only obligation is to help the 
displaced workers until they can find new employment. Likewise, the state should not refuse 
to license a new casino operation because of questions about its economic viability. The mar-
ket is the best judge of viability. If government assumes this role, the market may lose a 
potential competitor that could succeed by introducing innovations or creating new markets. 
Regulators that question the viability of an operation may have legitimate concerns. For 
example, will the operator go to an unsuitable source to get money if times tum tough? Will it 
try to create profits by cheating patrons? Careful monitoring of the operator and requiring 
submission of periodic reports can address these concerns. 
Likewise, regulators should not require casino operators to comply with economic con-
ditions that are not related to social goals of casino regulation. For example, suppose a regula-
tory agency questions the financial viability of a proposed casino. The agency may have a 
concern that if the casino fails it will not be able to pay its trade creditors. The agency may be 
sensitive to this possibility because other casino failures resulted in hardships to local trade 
creditors. The regulatory agency may consider requiring the casino to establish reserves to pay 
creditors even though other businesses or casinos in the community do not have to comply 
with similar requirements. This should be avoided. First, it takes discretion away from the 
business operator to use its funds where it believes the money could best be put to use. If that 
money could be used for promotion, but is unavailable, the property is now at a competitive 
disadvantage and may fail. Second, these requirements do not advance the real purpose of 
gaming control- to ensure that organized crime is not involved, that games are honest, and 
that the state receives its fair share of taxes. Having lay commissions act as economic directors 
in an otherwise competitive market is not effective. Third, the bankruptcy laws already protect 
trade creditors, and the bankruptcy courts are responsible for ensuring that all creditors are 
treated fairly. Gaming regulators should not accord special privileges to artificially chosen 
classes of creditors. Fourth, trade creditors must assume responsibility for their actions. If a 
person is in the business of providing goods or services, he needs to be responsible for deci-
sions such as allowing a customer to buy on credit. If that customer is a struggling hotel, the 
supplier can either require cash up-front or not accept the business. 
Taxation 
Casinos exist in three types of markets: monopolies, oligopolies, and competitive mar-
kets. Windsor, Ontario, is an example of a monopoly. The province has announced that only 
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one casino will be allowed in Windsor. It may not always be a monopoly, however, because 
Detroit may have legal casinos in the future. In the monopoly models, the taxes that casinos 
can pay the state can be much higher in most circumstances. In a monopoly, the casino usually 
will set odds more favorable to the house than in a competitive market. This pricing is a func-
tion of how many games the casino can offer before the cost of adding one additional game 
exceeds the revenues that can be derived from the additional game. This point is reached at 
different times in a monopoly and a competitive model. In a perfect competitive model, the 
marginal revenue curve is the same as the demand curve. This means that a competitive casino 
cannot increase prices- worsen the odds customers receive- without losing customers and, 
hence, money. In a monopoly, on the other hand, the marginal revenue curve intersects the 
marginal cost curve at a lower output and a higher price. This means that the monopoly casino 
can provide fewer games at worse odds or increase prices of other casino products without 
sacrificing earnings. 
Because a monopoly casino's margins are much higher, it can afford to pay higher taxes. 
For example, Splash, in Tunica, Mississippi, was the only casino in the Memphis area. It charged 
patrons for parking and to enter the casino, but still had four-hour lines just to enter the casino. 
Other casino operators were attracted to the area and eventually obtained the licenses needed 
to open. No longer a monopoly, Splash had to alter its pricing structure. Few patrons would be 
willing to pay for admission not charged by its competitors. Because it has few casinos, the 
Memphis area is not a perfect competitive model. Instead, it mirrors an oligopoly model where 
the profit maximizing price lies somewhere between that of the perfect competitive model and 
the monopoly model. 
When setting a tax structure, govern-
ment dictates output. In the casino industry, 
output equates to the number of games and 
devices that the casinos offer the public. The 
number of games and devices offered drives 
other areas such as the number of employ-
ees, capital investment, and ancillary and 
complementary industries. All industries 
A government's tax policy should be 
consistent with the purposes for which 
it legalized gaming. 
have demand curves for their product. Usually, the higher the cost, the lower the demand for 
the product. Taxation can be either a fixed or variable cost. In either case, it increases the cost 
of the product. The more the government taxes casino gaming, the lower the demand for the 
product. Conceivably, the government could tax the industry so heavily that patrons will go to 
other jurisdictions or will gamble with illegal operators. 
A government's tax policy should be consistent with the purposes for which it legalized 
gaming. If the purpose is to promote a gaming industry, encourage entrants, and maximize 
employment, then it is counterproductive to charge higher taxes. Perhaps most dangerous is to 
change tax policies on an established industry. Suppose you have a competitive industry that 
reached an equilibrium based on a tax rate of 10 percent. If you raise the tax rate to 20 percent, 
the industry needs to raise prices to stay profitable, which reduces demand. The lower demand 
results in an oversupply and the closure of some producers. The best example was when Colo-
rado raised its gaming taxes from 15 percent to 20 percent of gross gaming revenues. This 
raised the fixed costs for the casinos, making it unprofitable for many casinos to operate, and 
resulted in multiple closures. 
Barriers to Entry 
Of all factors necessary to support a free market model, a key is the absence of barriers to 
entries.5 Barriers to entry discourage potential competitors and thus allow the established firms 
to earn supernormal profits. How a market becomes a monopoly, oligopoly, or competitive 
can result from explicit regulation. For example, state law may dictate that there be only one 
casino or fifteen riverboats. Sometimes natural occurrences shape markets. For example, the 
Pacific island Tinian can physically hold, at most, only a few casinos. More often, the law will 
not dictate the number of casinos, but will influence whether a given market becomes a mo-
nopoly, oligopoly, or competitive. An example is where only a few sites in a state qualify 
under criteria limiting where an operator may place a casino. Another example is where the 
government requires substantial investment to qualify for a license. This may make investment 
attractive for the first entrant, who can make monopoly profits and, perhaps, for a few more 
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entrants. At some point, however, potential competitors will notbe willing to enter the market 
because the potential profits do not justify the capital costs. 
Finally, the licensing system employed by a state will influence the number of competi-
tors. In a perfect competitive system, competitors will enter the market if the existing entrants 
are making extraordinary profits. How quickly or easily they can enter the market is greatly 
influenced by licensing. Obviously, existing competitors will have an advantage if the licens-
ing process creates an enormous barrier. 
Licensing can create barriers to entry in four major ways. First, it can add uncertainty 
and risk to the decision to enter a market if regulators regularly deny licens~s to applicants. All 
things being equal, a company will devote its resources to a market where it is more likely to 
obtain a license. Second, the length of time that a licensing investigation takes may create a 
barrier. Companies that want to enter a market do so based on the current economics of that 
market. If licensing takes a substantial amount of time, the company must forecast the eco-
nomics for when it may obtain its license. This adds risk to the decision to enter the market. 
Third is the cost of licensing. A potential entrant will consider the cost of licensing to decide if 
its money will generate a higher return in this market or business as opposed to another. Fi-
nally, the licensing process may cause social stigma and embarrassment to a potential entrant. 
This may discourage some companies, especially diversified companies where embarrassing 
news could hurt its other businesses. 
Governments should understand that the laws promoting barriers to entry affect 
competitive markets and have economic costs. Monopoly and oligopoly markets result in higher 
cost to the consumer and lower output. In the casino industry, lower output means higher net 
profits on lower gross revenues. It also means lower employment and fewer games and devices. 
Regulatory Price Controls 
In most industries, regulatory price controls means the government sets prices for ser-
vices. For example, a state public service commission may fix basic telephone rates. In the 
casino industry, government sets rates by dictating the odds of the games. For example, Colo-
rado requires casinos to offer no more than double odds on craps and to have both "0" and "00" 
on their roulette tables, requirements that increase or help preserve the casinos' edge. These 
regulations set prices in the gaming industry. So do requirements that a casino use multiple 
decks in blackjack, another edge-preserving rule. 
Price setting disrupts a competitive market. Often price setting helps established firms 
because it eliminates competitive pricing. If the industry's market is only local residents, price 
setting may be good for casinos that do not have to compete based on price, if the price set is 
above market price. This is bad for patrons, however, who will not get the lowest prices. If the 
market is national or regional, price setting may harm both the patrons and the casinos. A 
problem in these jurisdictions is that serious players do not like the rigidity of fixed odds. They 
prefer to play at casinos that compete based on odds because they get a better deal. Patrons 
benefit from price setting only in systems, such as monopolies, where the casino could and 
would give worse odds if the law did not mandate better odds. 
A similar consideration is regulatory flexibility in adapting to market conditions. In other 
words, does the casino have business discretion to change game rules and procedures, game 
mix, and to introduce new games? If it does, the casino industry can adopt new trends and 
technologies very quickly. For example, if a new game becomes popular, can the casino ex-
pose it for play or does it need to go through a laborious approval process? Businesses that can 
adapt quickly have a better chance of surviving. 
Advertising 
Whether to allow casinos to advertise is a policy decision based on the potential negative 
impact of gaming on a community. Proponents of a ban on casino advertising argue that it 
encourages people who would otherwise not gamble to use nondiscretionary funds for gaming 
purposes: Instead of buying books, appliances, or food, they spend their money on slot ma-
chines. Thus, society as a whole will suffer because the general standard of living will de-
crease. Some states, however, confuse their goals and policies. On one hand, they want casinos 
to provide jobs and taxes but on the other wish to discourage gambling by banning advertising. 
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Banning casino advertising but allowing casino gaming can be consistent. In societies 
that permit legal gaming and have rational policies underlying their regulatory structure, two 
distinct systems exist. In the first model, society does not restrict the gaming industries' abil-
ity to stimulate demand for its product. In this model, a casino can advertise, offer induce-
ments to patrons, provide entertainment, and do other activities that increase patronage. 
In the second model, called unstimulated demand, society allows at least some casinos, 
but prohibits them from activities that stimulate demand for their product. In these societies, 
casinos cannot advertise, offer entertainment, sponsor junkets, or conduct other activities that 
stimulate interest in casino gaming. Great Britain is the purest form of the unstimulated de-
mand model. The government will grant a casino license only if the applicant proves that the 
area where it proposes to operate the casino has a substantial unstimulated demand for casino 
gaming and no other gaming facilities are available. Moreover, British casinos cannot pro-
vide live entertainment. Outside signs cannot encourage people to enter the casino. Potential 
players must wait forty-eight hours before obtaining membership allowing them to gamble. 
British casinos also may not issue credit. 
Underlying the British system is not a belief that gaming is immoral. The system is built 
on rational social policy. Prohibiting gaming is unsatisfactory, according to the proponents of 
this model, who view gambling as inevitable. If gambling is illegal, some citizens will gamble 
with illegal operators. This allows criminals to finance other illegal activities and encourages 
police corruption. Moreover, the government cannot ensure that the illegal operators will 
treat players fairly and not engage in abusive collection practices. On the other hand, the 
proponents of the British system believe that allowing casinos to stimulate demand for casino 
gaming is also undesirable. They reason that gaming creates social burdens, particularly com-
pulsive gambling and gaming by those who cannot afford it. They assert that compulsive 
gambling can devastate families and individuals. Likewise, encouraging gambling may result 
in nondiscretionary dollars going to gaming instead of food, clothing, education, and health 
care. As a result, either the standard of living goes down or the government must provide 
additional services. Consequently, Great Britain prevents casinos from stimulating demand 
for its product. 
Hybrid models, which borrow elements of the stimulated or unstimulated demand mod-
els, also exist. Puerto Rico, for example, allows casinos to stimulate demand outside Puerto 
Rico to attract tourism, but does not allow casinos to advertise within the Commonwealth. 
Other jurisdictions allow casinos to stimulate demand outside their borders, but prohibit their 
own population from engaging in gaming. 
Adopting an unstimulated demand model is acceptable public policy if government 
understands the potential consequences of such a decision. A component of the unstimulated 
demand model is the ban on advertising. In a competitive market, consumers can make ratio-
nal decisions on where to spend their money only if they have information about the rates 
charged and the products offered by competitors. A common method of acquiring such infor-
mation is through advertising. While advertising is often an imperfect source of information, 
it is better than no information at all. In the casino industry, casinos frequently advertise 
straight pricing information that consumers would find of the greatest value. For example, 
some casinos will advertise that their blackjack games have single decks or their craps games 
offer ten-times odds. 
Like price setting, a ban on advertising disrupts a competitive market. Often this 
disruption helps established firms, but also can hurt the entire industry. In a closed market, 
the ban may benefit existing casinos as it prevents consumers from making rational decisions 
on where to bet and promotes oligopoly pricing. If the market is close to another market that 
allows advertising, it may be counterproductive because the other market can use advertising 
to draw price-conscious consumers. In all instances, a ban on advertising burdens the patron, 
who has greater difficulty obtaining pricing information. 
Credit Play 
Credit play is the process of allowing patrons to gamble on credit by signing credit 
instruments that the casino can negotiate through normal banking channels. Public policy 
debates over whether the government should allow casinos to grant credit address collection 
methods, effect on patrons, and competitiveness. Three principal arguments against casino 
credit are that allowing credit (1) will allow casinos to engage in undesirable methods of 
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collection, (2) could result in casinos skimming funds through the writing off gaming debts or 
not reporting paid debts, and (3) would result in patrons losing more than they can afford. 
The first concern is historical rather than real. Tile gal gaming, by definition, is operated 
by criminals. Because of their willingness to ignore criminal statutes and engage in illegal 
gambling, they also have little regard for other laws, including debt collection procedures. In 
stark contrast, legal gaming operators undergo rigorous licensing examinations, including 
whether they conducted their businesses in strict compliance with all laws. The public still 
confuses prior illegal gaming operators with the legal gaming operators. The perception of 
organized crime accomplices collecting gaming debts is confused with the professional and 
ethical enforcement of credit found today. Engaging in any illegal or tortious collection practices 
would jeopardize a gaming operator's license. Federal laws also govern abusive collection 
practices that give substantial rights to debtors. In recent times, no Nevada gaming operator 
has been charged with any crimes related to debt collection or been successfully sued for such. 
Good regulation can prevent the skimming of funds through the credit process. Casinos 
can abuse the credit process in two ways. Most states tax gross revenues, which is all money 
the casino retains as its winnings, less all money the casino pays out as losses. This allows the 
first method of skimming: A person in association with a casino obtains cash or chips by 
opening a credit line, does not gamble, and converts the chips to cash. The casino, in turn, 
makes no collection effort and writes the debt off. The net effect is that the funds go to a third 
party, are not legitimate gaming debts, and the casino pays no taxes. In the second method, a 
casino employee or owner collects a debt from a patron, does not report its collection, and 
records the debt as uncollectible. Both situations are adequately addressed by regulation and 
proper enforcement. Licensees must maintain extensive records on all credit players and must 
Licensees must maintain extensive 
records on all credit players and must 
follow detailed internal controls in issuing 
and collecting gaming credit. 
follow detailed internal controls in is-
suing and collecting gaming credit. 
These procedures ensure that one or two 
casino employees cannot work with a 
third party to defraud the casino. En-
forcement procedures allow the regu-
lators to verify the accuracy of the in-
formation contained in the records. 
The final issue concerns whether 
the extension of credit encourages pa-
trons to gamble beyond their means. Good long-range casino planning dictates that the casinos 
not allow patrons to lose more than they can afford. Casinos want to retain a patron's business 
over many years. Casinos do this by keeping patrons within their means. If a patron exceeds 
his limits, the casino risks losing the patron's business and reducing the likelihood of collec-
tion. Nevertheless, some patrons and casinos do abuse the credit process. Patrons often do this 
by obtaining credit at many casinos, the cumulative effect of which is to exceed their means. 
Casinos try to avoid this by using credit reporting services but are not always successful. If a 
jurisdiction finds that some casinos are recklessly granting credit, a regulation capping the 
percentage of credit that can be written off as uncollectible may limit this problem. 
Given that the percentage of players and casino that abuse the credit process is extremely 
small, the issue is whether government should prohibit all credit. This debate centers on the 
effectiveness and role of government. First, will prohibiting credit reduce the incidence of 
patrons losing more money than they can afford? Second, even if it does, should government 
dictate to its citizens what legal activities they may and may not borrow money to engage in? 
Third, will the banning of credit play have a greater negative effect on the gaming industry and 
those associated with it than any benefit that may be derived? Fourth, are there less burden-
some alternatives than a total ban? The latter two issues address the economic effect on a 
jurisdiction's gaming industry resulting from the loss of the ability to grant credit. 
Banning credit can have a substantial economic effect if an area's casino industry com-
petes with another jurisdiction that allows credit. Many patrons who gamble well within their 
means prefer to gamble on credit so that they do not need to carry large amounts of cash. These 
patrons are more likely to gamble in jurisdictions that allow credit. The federal government 
also created an artificial demand for gaming credit play by adopting cash reporting require-
ments. Under federal law, casinos must file reports on patrons who lose more than $10,000 in 
cash, but need not make similar reports for patrons who gamble on credit and pay with a check. 
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Patrons who are offended by government intrusion into their personal spending habits also 
prefer to gamble on credit. 
Conclusion 
What can a state do to help its casino industry? First, it can make the cost of doing 
business cheaper. There are two ways to do this: Reduce the cost of regulation, and reduce 
taxes. If it is cheaper to do business in one state, then its casino industry can offer its product at 
a lower price and better compete against other casinos and recreational opportunities in other 
states. Reducing taxes on the casino industry is difficult in tight financial times. The worst 
scenario, given increasing competition in other states, is to raise gaming taxes. 
The second avenue is to reduce the cost of regulation. This includes repealing regula-
tions that cost money to comply with but that have little or no regulatory value. This requires 
cost analysis of regulation. Another vehicle is to reduce regulatory costs by building better 
mouse traps, that is, by finding ways to accomplish regulatory goals at lower cost. 
States with established regulatory systems should regularly solicit comments from the 
industry about how regulation can work better and cheaper. Old regulations need to be exam-
ined regularly from a cost -benefit analysis. States implementing gaming and regulations should 
not blindly adopt laws of other states without examining cost and benefit in light of their own 
circumstances, capabilities, and goals. 
The third avenue is to make rational decisions on the degree, cost, and duration of the 
licensing process, credit policy, price controls, and advertising. 
References 
1Eugene M. Christiansen, The Role of Government in Commercial Gambling, l THE GAMBLING STUDIEs: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAMBLING AND RISK TAKING 128 ( 1985). 
2Richard Lehne, CASINO PoLICY 45 (1986). 
3Alfred N. King, Public Gaming and Public Trust, 12 CoNN. L.R. 740 (1980). 
4Richard I. Aaron, Maintaining Financial Integrity of the Casino Through Licensing Regulation, 9 THE 
GAMBLING PAPERS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAMBLING AND RISK TAKING 127 
(1982) 
5These barriers can take on many forms. Barriers to entry include: 
a. Extreme or significant capital requirements resulting from scale effects. 
b. The existence of patents or copyrights. 
c. Scarcity of or control over a necessary resource. 
d. Excessive skill or knowledge requirements. 
e. Social, cultural, or religious taboos. 
f. Absolute cost advantages, i.e., advantages possessed by established firms who are able to sus-
tain a lower average total cost than new entrants irrespective of size of output. 
g. Large initial capital requirements. 
h. Product differentiation, either natural or artificial, such as advertising. 
i. Retaliation or pre-emptive actions. 
j. Vertical integration, i.e., requiring entry at two or more levels. 
k. Governmental restraints. 
18 Gaming Research & Review Journal- Volume 1, Issue 1 - 1994 
